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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most existing models of economic development posit for the agricultural sector
a role that consists of producing generic commodities or food to cities, while
development is characterized by the growth of the "modern" industrial sector
absorbing the excess labor from the rural sector. The agricultural sector has
been paid little attention as the engine of economic growth, generally being
attributed constant returns to scale technology without product diﬀerentiation,
innovation, and knowledge externalities.
Agricultural sector has a speciﬁc characteristics of being bound to land.
Therefore, its activities are geographically dispersed and cannot form a large
dense concentration. This may be disadvantageous for innovation dynamics
which can be stimulated by knowledge spillover within an agglomeration. The
dispersed location also leads to disparity of competitive condition depending on
the accessibility of principal markets. Other natural conditions such as topogra-
phy, land fertility, and climate also greatly aﬀect the productivity of agriculture.
In reality, a signiﬁcant proportion of the population resides in rural area, and
thus improving their living condition is one of great concerns for policy makers.
If farmers at disadvantageous locations were to continue producing only generic
goods under perfect competition, intensifying pressure from global trade liber-
alization will leave them no room but for surviving with subsidies.
In the past the location of agriculture has been studied by using the bid-
rent approach originated by von Thünen1. The von Thünen model is based on
the neoclassical assumption of perfect competition and constant return to scale.
Within such framework, high valued products tend to locate near the market
1For detail, see Chapter 3 in Fujita and Thisse, 2002.
1(city) while the remote periphery is occupied by low valued commodity which
needs extensive use of the land.
Recently, Fujita (2006) challenged this view by proposing a model introduc-
ing product diﬀerentiation in the agricultural sector. He showed that appro-
priate location of diﬀerentiated agriculture depends on its degree of product
diﬀerentiation. Namely, the less diﬀerentiated products such as fresh vegeta-
bles should be grown near the metropolis because they are close substitutes for
generic products, but highly unique products can be produced in remote villages
using strong monopolistic power as well as taking advantage of low land rent
and wage. This result implies that diﬀerentiated products with certain monop-
olistic power can avoid direct competition in price and cost, leading to granting
higher income to producers. Thus, they are suitable to farmers without good
accessibility to large markets.
As an extension of Fujita (2006) that was studied within a restrictive partial
equilibrium framework, this paper introduces diﬀerentiated agricultural prod-
ucts in the standard general equilibrium model of the New Economic Geogra-
phy (NEG). Farmers in this sector produce diﬀerentiated agricultural products
(denoted as brand agricultural products) involving economies of scale. In this
context, we examine the location of brand agriculture in terms of the degree
of product diﬀerentiation and transport costs using the potential function ap-
proach. This paper also aims at providing a theoretical basis for the policy
discussion on the role of innovation and infrastructure in rural development.
In reality, rural development based on brand agriculture is not new. In the
remote regions of Japan today, for instance, there exit hundres of small villages
where highly unique agricultural goods are produced. For example, when we
2visited a small town called Kamikatsu located in deep mountain of Shikoku
Island of Japan, we witnessed highly successful business run by the organization
of town residents producing the ornaments made of local leaves and ﬂowers used
by sophisticated Japanese cuisine restaurants . They have established unique
business model utilizing information technology and air cargo transportation for
the on-demand delivery of seasonal objects requested by the restaurants. They
now earn nearly ten times as high income as the past when they used to lived on
ordinary forestry and tangerine farming. For another instance, Japan imported
359 tones of roses from Kenya in 2006, roughly corresponding to 8% in quantity
and 20% in value of the total imports of that product. As shown by the numbers,
Kenyan roses are of higher value. Such roses are grown in the high land of more
than 1000 meter height on the equator. The place oﬀers natural advantage for
the production of high quality ﬂowers with constant climate having long hours
under day light during the whole year, large temperature gap between the day
and the night, and lower risk of harmful insect. Despite the long distance,
exports to Japan became possible thanks to the provision of cold storage house
in Dubai airport which is used for the transit of the air cargo. These examples
suggest that remote rural are can be connected to a large market by utilizing
eﬃcient transportation system and product diﬀerentiation taking advantage of
the local natural condition.
In the next section, we present the basic structure of the model in general
setting. In Section 3, in the context of a hub-and-spoke system of the core-
periphery economy, we derive outcomes in the factor market and those in the
product markets. Based on these results, Section 4 examines the location equi-
librium without considering the mobility of workers among regions. In Section
35, we allow the migration in response to the real wage diﬀerence and analyze
the properties of the long-run equilibrium. Some policy implications are drawn
in the ﬁnal section.2
2M o d e l
2.1 Utility and demand
The economy has three types of products, the generic agricultural product
(A), the diﬀerentiated agricultural products dubbed as the "brand agricultural
products" (B), and the manufactured products (M). Both B-products and M-
products consist of a continuum of varieties. All consumers of the economy
share the same utility function described as
U = AαABαBMαM where αA + αB + αM =1 . (1)
where A is the consumption of A-product whereas B and M represent respec-
tively the index of the consumption of B-products and that of M-products.
When B-sector and M-sector respectively provide a continuum of diﬀerentiated













where x(i) and q(j) represent respectively the consumption of B-variety i ∈
[0,n B] of that of M-variety j ∈ [0,n M]. The parameters ρB and ρM stand
2Although the present paper uses a static framework, it is possible to extend the model to
a dynamic framework in which new brand agrarian products are consecutively developed over
time as in Fujita and Thisse (2003).
4for substitutability of each variety over the diﬀerentiated products. When ρB
is close to 1, for example, diﬀerentiated B-products are nearly perfect sub-
stitutes for each other while as ρB decreases towards 0, the desire to con-
sume greater variety of B-products increases. If we set σB ≡ 1Á(1 − ρB) and
σM ≡ 1Á(1 − ρM),t h e nσB represents the elasticity of substitution between
any pair of varieties of B-products, and σM that of M-products, taking values
between 1 and ∞.
If Y denotes the consumer income, PA the price of A-product, pB(i) the price
of i-th variety of B-products, and pM(j) the price of j-th variety of M-products,






























52.2 Location and transport costs
Let r =1 ,2,...,N represent each region in the economy. We assume the "iceberg
transport cost" regarding the inter-regional trade. Speciﬁcally, if a unit of any
variety of B-product is shipped from a region r to another region s,o n l ya
fraction 1/TB
rs of the original unit actually arrives while the rest perishes away
on its way. Likewise, we deﬁne the transport parameter for A-product and M-
products respectively by TA
rs,a n dT M
rs ,w h e r eTA
rs > 1,TB
rs > 1,TM
rs > 1 for
r 6= s.L e tPA
r , pB
r ,a n dpM
r be respectively the f.o.b. price of A-product, that of
B-products, and that of M-products in region r. Then, the transport technology
implies that the delivered (c.i.f) prices PA
rs, pB
rs,a n dpM



















r be the number of B-products produced in region r (which equals the
number of B-ﬁrms in region r), and nM
r the number of M-products produced in





































The farmer of generic agriculture produces ar unit of A-product using one unit
of land and cA unit of labor. Let wr and Rr be the wage and the land rent
in region r, then the proﬁt per unit of land earned by A-product farmer in
region r is πA
r = arPA
r − cAwr − Rr.S i n c et h eA-product market is in perfect
competition, the equilibrium proﬁt becomes zero. Thus, setting πA
r =0 , we
obtain the A-sector’s bid-rent in region r which represents the maximum rent
that an A-sector farmer can pay in region r :
RA
r = arPA
r − cAwr (10)
2.3.2 Brand agriculture
The technology in B-sector is such that one unit of output requires the composite
of one unit of land and cB units of labor. We also assume that ﬁxed fB units
of the same composite are required. Due to the ﬁxed input, economies of scale
arise at the level of variety. When a farm produces xr units of a B-product in
region r,the proﬁti s
πB
r = pB
r xr − (cBwr + Rr)xr − (cBwr + Rr)fB (11)
Using (3), when the f.o.b. price of a B-product produced in region r is pB
r ,t h e






























Assuming that each B-sector farm takes the price index (8) as given, the
f.o.b. price pB






Since the marginal cost is cBwr+Rr, (14) means that each farm uses a mark-up
equal to 1/ρB. Notice that smaller ρB (i.e. smaller σB) means a higher degree


















Substituting (14) and (15) into (13) yields the total sales of a variety of















In this expression, the denominator in the ﬁrst term represents the ﬁxed cost
advantage of region r, which is stronger as the cost of labor and land is smaler.
In the second term, αBYs in the numerator is the expenditure for B-products




¢σB−1 represents the inverse measure of the severeness
of competition of B-products in the market s because a higher price index PB
s
m e a n st h a ti ti se a s i e rt os e l lB-products in that market. Thus, the numerator





¤σB−1 in which (cBwr + Rr)TB
rs represents the
marginal cost in supplying a unit of a B-product from region r to s. In sum, the
second term of (16) gives the sum of the eﬀective size of the demand in each
market for a B-variety produced in region r.
As a special case, suppose that σB is suﬃciently close to one. Then, (16)









Thus, when the products are highly diﬀerentiated, the eﬀect of transporta-
tion cost vanishes and the eﬀective size of the demand depends only on the ﬁxed
cost advantage. This result suggests the viability of brand agriculture in the
remote periphery provided that these products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
Since (11) and (14) imply πB





,b ys e t t i n g
πB
r =0we obtain the equilibrium output of each active B-product farm as
x∗ =( σB − 1)fB. (18)
The associated equilibrium labor input is
lB∗
r = cBσBfB. (19)
and land input is
gB∗
r = σBfB. (20)
9Notice that since these results do not depend on location, the index r can
be dropped. Setting ˜ xr = x∗ and solving the equation for Rr we obtain the





















is a positive constant. This bid-rent is the
maximum rent that a B-sector farmer can pay under zero-proﬁt. If the prevailing
market land rent is greater than the bid-rent, the B-sector production cannot
be sustained there because farmers’ proﬁt turns negative. On the other hand,
if the bid-rent is greater than the market rent, it implies that the farmers earn
positive proﬁt because ˜ xr >x ∗. This will, in turn, induce more B-sector farmers
to locate there and the competition eventually drives the proﬁt to zero. Hence
we have
nB
r > 0 ⇒ RB




M-products are produced using labor only. M-sector ﬁrms require marginal
input of cM units of labor in addition to cMfM units of ﬁxed labor. Thus, the
proﬁto faﬁrm in region r is given by
πM
r = pM
r qr − wrcMqr − wrcMfM (22)
where qr represents the sales of the ﬁrm’s product given by (4). Using (4), when
the f.o.b. price of a M-product produced in region r is pM
r , the demand for the
























Assuming that each ﬁrm takes the price index PM
r as given, the f.o.b. price























As for the case of B-products demand, (24) takes into account eﬀective size of
demand of each market.






wrcM,b ys e t t i n gπM
r =0
we obtain zero-proﬁt equilibrium output of each active M-ﬁrm in region r as
q∗ =( σM − 1)fM (27)
and the associated labor input lM∗
= cMσMfM.
112.4 The equilibrium of factor markets when workers are
immobile
For the moment, let us consider the situation where the population Lr in region
r is ﬁxed. This may represent the case where each region represents a small
country. Or, it may represents a short-run equilibrium. Later, we will relax this
assumption and allow migration in response to the real wage diﬀerence.
First, consider the land market. Let Gr be the size of the land in region r.
Land is used by both A-sector and B-sector and GA
r denotes the land utilized
by the former and GB
r the latter. Since ar units of A-product can be produced
on one unit of land, if QA
r is the total output of A-product in region r,t h el a n d







Given the land input (20) of a B-product farmer producing the equilibrium
output, the land used by nB





When Rr > 0, the land in region r is fully occupied by the two types of agricul-
ture, implying that
Rr > 0= ⇒ GA
r + GB
r = Gr (30)
Assuming perfectly competitive land market, the equilibrium land rent Rr in
12region r equals the highest bid rent:









r are respectively given by (10) and (21).

























r = Lr, (35)





r cBσBfB + nM
r cMσMfM = Lr. (36)
The total factor income in region r is
Yr = Lrwr + GrRr (37)












13When the population in each region is ﬁxed, ωr may diﬀer across regions. When
labor is freely mobile among regions, ωr should be equalized for all r where
Lr > 0.
3 The hub-and-spoke core-periphery economy
3.1 Speciﬁcation of the spatial structure
Consider the core-periphery economic space with "hub-and-spoke" transporta-
tion system depicted by Figure 1. The core denoted as region 0 is a transporta-
tion hub that is directly connected with each region in the periphery consisting
of m regions. For simplicity, we focus on the case of a symmetric geographic con-
ﬁguration. Region 0 is endowed with G0 units of land and L0 units of workers.
Let region r =1 ,...,m represent each region in the periphery and we assume that
all regions are endowed with the same G1units of land and L1 units of workers.
Transport cost between region 0 and region r is symmetric in both directions
and the same transport costs apply for all r: TA
0r = TA





r0 ≡ TM. We also assume that there is no direct transport connection
within the periphery between region r and another region, say region s 6= r,r e -
quiring that the trade between r and s always passes through region 0. Hence,











Suppose that all M-sector ﬁrms are located in region 0 and B-products are
produced only in the periphery. In this conﬁguration, M-products are exported
from the core to each region in the periphery, whereas B-products are sold not
only from each region in the periphery to the core but also among all regions in
14Core








































the periphery through region 0.
We assume that A-product is produced in all regions and each region is
in self-suﬃciency of A-product. Since A-product is a homogeneous good that
consumers always buy from the cheapest source, this assumption implies that
TA is so high that once brought to the other region the delivered price is always









15We are now ready to specify the results obtained in the previous section in
the context of the this geographic conﬁguration. By condition (31), any attempt
to produce B-products in region 0 should fail because no B-product farmer can
bid out the prevailing market rent paid by A-product farmers. On the other
hand, since both A-product and B-products are produced in the periphery, the
two sectors must be able to pay the same land rent in zero-proﬁt. To summarize,
QA
0 > 0,n B




1 > 0,n B




We set w0 =1for normalization Then, the land rent in region 0 given by (10)
can be written as
R0 = a0PA
0 − cA (41)
In each region of the periphery, using (40) we can express the land rent
R1 = a1PA
1 − cAw1 = RB
1 , (42)
Price indices and regional income are speciﬁed as follows. Using (15) and






































16Income in region 0 and each region in the periphery given by (37) are speciﬁed
as:
Y0 = L0 + G0(a0PA
0 − cA) (47)







In the context of the hub-and-spoke spatial system, we now examine the market
clearing conditions of productive factors (labor and land) and products assuming
that workers are immobile among regions.
3.2.1 Factor markets
In region 0, workers are employed either in A-sector or in M-sector. Using (36),







0 cMσMfM = L0 (49)
In each region in the periphery, workers are employed either in A-sector or in







1 cBσBfB = L1 (50)
Assuming that the land in region 0 is fully occupied by A-sector, equilibrium











Notice that for nM∗
0 to be positive, it must hold that
L0 >c AG0. (53)
We assume this condition holds throughout the rest of our analysis.
T h el a n di ne a c hr e g i o ni nt h ep e r i p h e r ya c c o m m o d a t e sb o t ht h eg e n e r i c
agriculture and the brand agriculture. Thus, using (28) - (30) the land market





1 σBfB = G1 (54)






Using (54) and (55), we obtain the equilibrium output of A-product in each






18In order to be QA
1
∗ > 0 and nB∗
1 > 0,i tm u s th o l de i t h e r
cB >L 1/G1 >c A (57)
or
cB <L 1/G1 <c A,
implying that the labor intensities of the two types of agricultures are suﬃciently
diﬀerent. Provided that the B-sector is more labor intensive than A-sector, we
assume that condition (57) holds in the rest of the paper.
3.2.2 Product markets
Assuming the self-suﬃciency of A-sector in each region, using (2), (47), (48),
(51) and (56), the market clearing of A-product in each region means
a0G0 =











Solving them for PA
0 and PA
















N e x t ,w ee x a m i n et h ei n t e r - r e g i o n a lt r a d eo fM-products. Recall that all
M-products are produced in region 0. Using (24), (26) and (27), the market
clearing of a M-product is given by




















Substituting (52), (58) and (59) into (61), then solving the equation for w1,w e











Notice that for w∗
1 > 0 it requires that (cB − cA)G1 − L1−cAG1
αM+αB > 0,o r
L1 < {(αB + αM)(cB − cA)+cA}G1, (63)
implying that labor size in each region in the periphery is not too large. This
condition is assumed to hold in the rest of the paper. Substituting (62) into
(59), the associated PA























Substituting (58), (62) and (64) into (41) and (42), equilibrium land rent in






















































4 Location equilibrium when workers are immo-
bile
4.1 A-sector
Recall that we have assumed that A-product is in self-suﬃcient in all regions.
This assumption relies on the condition given by (39). Substituting (65) into











21implying that transport cost for A-product is suﬃciently high. In the rest of
the paper, this condition is assumed to hold.
4.2 B-sector
So far, we have assumed a priori that all B-production is located in region 1. In
this section, we examine the condition under which B-production is indeed never
viable in region 1. To do so, we use the potential function approach proposed
by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).
Suppose that a farmer starts producing B-product in region 0. Using (16),






























which we call the potential function of B-product in region 1. It is obvious by
deﬁnition that
πB
0 S 0 as ΩB
0 S 1 (73)
Hence, when ΩB
1 is greater than 1 (resp. less than 1), the brand agriculture
is proﬁtable (resp. not proﬁtable) in region 1. Substituting (71) into (72) and














Hereafter, we assume that m is so large that the term m
(TB)2(σB−1)+(m−1) in
the numerator in brackets degenerates to one, and hence the term in brackets


















Recall tha αA ≡ 1−αM −αB. Based on (73) we can examine the condition for
ΩB
















where L1ÁG1 − cA > 0 by (57) and L0ÁG0 − cA > 0 by (53). This condition
can be satisﬁed, for example, when m is suﬃciently large.
4.3 M-sector
Next, let us turn to the location equilibrium of M-sector. We apply the potential
function approach again to examine the condition under which the production
of M-product is not viable in the periphery as we stipulate for this geographic
conﬁguration.
Suppose that a ﬁrm starts producing M-product in the periphery. We deﬁne








Then the location equilibrium condition for M-sector can be stated as
πM
1 S 0 as ΩM
1 S 1 (78)
Hence, when ΩM
1 is greater than 1 (resp. less than 1), the manufacturing is
proﬁtable (resp. not proﬁtable) in the periphery. Using (24), the eﬀective size
































Substituting (45), (46), (62), (69) and (79) into (77), we obtain (see Appen-




















Assuming that m is a very large number, the term
n
(TM)
2(σM−1) +( m − 1)
o
Ám
in the second term degenerates to one, hence the second term can be dropped.
With this assumption, we obtain the location equilibrium condition given by












Given (53), (57) and (63), the left hand is positive. It turns out that the left
hand side of (81) is the inverse of the equilibrium wage in the periphery given
by (62). Then, if w∗
1 > 1, the location equilibrium of M-sector always hold since
TM > 1 by deﬁnition. If w∗
2 < 1, this condition more likely holds with high TM
because the move to the periphery should cost the ﬁrm a loss of demand in the
core market.
4.4 Location equilibrium
We are now ready to examine location equilibrium conditions of both B-sector
and M-sector together. focusing on the values of αM +αB and αMÁαB,l e tt h e




































Given a ﬁxed value of αMÁαB Figure 2 depicts ϕB and ϕM respectively as


















then, there exits a range of parameters that satisﬁes both (76) and (81).
This result is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose workers are immobile among regions. The hub-and-
spoke system of the core-periphery spatial structure is in equilibrium when (76)
26and (81) are satisﬁed. When condition (84) holds, there exists a range of para-
meters that satisfy both (76) and (81).
Proposition 1 conﬁrms above discussion based on (17) that the brand agri-
culture is viable in the periphery even when its transport cost is high provided
that these products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. It also suggests that the core-
periphery structure is more likely to be in equilibrium with higher transport
cost of manufactured goods because, despite of the ﬁxed cost advantage,ﬁrms
ﬁnd it not attractive to locate in the periphery for the loss of demand in the
core market . Notice that the local market in the periphery is assumed to be
fragmented due to the assumption of the hub-and-spoke structure.
5 Location equilibrium with mobile workers
So far, we have analyzed the market outcome assuming a ﬁxed population distri-
bution, ignoring inter-regional migration in response to the real wage diﬀerence.
In this section, we relax this assumption and examine the location equilibrium
with mobile workers, which may represent the case of long-run equilibrium where
the real wage is equalized in all regions. Yet, keeping the assumption of sym-
metric regions in the periphery, we always assume Lr = L1 for all r.
Let L be the total number of workers in the economy. Then, we have
L0 + mL1 ≡ L. (85)
We assume that a worker moves toward the region that oﬀers higher real
wage. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne an ad-hoc population dynamics:
27•
L1 = L1 (ω1 − ω0)L0 (86)




































































Figure 3 depicts (90) taking L1 on the horizontal axis. By the population
dynamics given by (86), migration leads the economy to the equilibrium point
E where ω0 = ω1. However, by condition given by (84), it should be satisﬁed
that αM
αB mL1−cAG1
















28where L1 is the lower bound of L1 shown in Figure 3. In some cases, mobility of
workers may lead to the outbound of the feasible range of L1,s a yp o i n tE
0
.This
can happen, for example, when a1/a0 (relative productivity advantage of generic
agriculture in the periphery) and TB
αBTM
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Figure 3: Long-run equilibrium
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we extended the NEG model introducing the brand agriculture
sector. We focused on the core-periphery spatial structure with hub-and-spoke
29transport system, where manufacturing is concentrated in the core and the re-
gions in the periphery produce brand agriculture products. Our result shows
that the brand agriculture is sustainable in the remote periphery provided that
these products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. Although the rural periphery has
been considered as the supplier of the generic primary commodities in our com-
mon perception, we contend that the innovation eﬀorts in developing diﬀer-
entiated agriculture and implementing appropriate measures to facilitate the
market access of such products enable the periphery to increase its income. The
Proposition 1 states that disadvantageous transport condition of the periphery
can be overcome through product diﬀerentiation and also by taking advantage
of low ﬁxed cost there. We found that
In contrast to the general perception of development strategy of thinking the
industrialization in cities ﬁrst and then expecting the trickle-down of income
growth toward rural sector, the approach in this paper highlights the necessity
of thinking up side down: thinking ﬁrst the innovation to prosper based on the
local advantage in each rural area. The NEG literature has emphasized that
the power of mega cities will increase in the era of globalization. It also refers
to the increasing development potential of well-connected medium-sized cities,
or "near periphery", as the congestion in mega cities grows. Meantime, the
agricultural hinterland, or "far periphery", has been paid little attention in the
literature, and the widening income gap between the core and the periphery has
been recognized as a serious problem. While we should cast more critical think-
ing on the neoclassical theory based trickle-down strategy, the NEG approach
has not been able to provide meaningful policy implication to this burning ques-
tion due to the simplistic assumption on the rural sector. Our approach suggests
30a promising research direction to ﬁll that gap.
Appendix
Appendix 1
In section 3.2, we examined equilibrium conditions of the factor market (land
and labor) in each region and market clearing of A-product and M-products.
Hence, according to the Walras’ law, the remaining B-products market should be
also in equilibrium in our general equilibrium setting. However, it is appropriate
to examine whether this condition is really satisﬁed to check the consistency of
the model.
Following (31), we establish the equilibrium condition of B-product market
such that bid rent given by (21) should be equal to the zero-proﬁtl a n dr e n t
paid by A-good farmers. In this case RB




















σB − cBw1 (A1)



























Focusing on the right hand side, we substitute (42) for R1 and (62) for w1 while
using (64) for PA
1 . Then we obtain





(cB − cA) (A3)
Substitutions of (62) and (64) into (47) and (48) yield























This proves that B-product farmers are in zero proﬁt equilibrium and all equi-
librium solutions which we obtained for this geographic conﬁguration are con-
sistent.
32Appendix 2























In this expression, the denominator of the ﬁrst term of the right hand side
represents the ﬁxed cost of production. Thus, the ﬁrst term together shows
the ﬁxed cost advantages of region 0 in brand agriculture production, which is
larger as the ﬁxed cost is smaller. The ﬁrst term inside the braces represents
eﬀective size of the demand at market in region 0 provided the potential mar-




¢σB−1 , discounted by the marginal supply cost,
(cB + R0)
σB−1. Likewise, the numerator and the denominator of the second
term in the braces respectively refers to the eﬀective demand in the periphery
market and the marginal supply cost from region 0. Substituting further (43)








































1 =1since all existing farmers of B-sector in region 1 are operating
33under zero proﬁt equilibrium. Substituting this into (A7), we obtain (74).
Appendix 3
























































It is obvious that ΩM
0 =1because all active M-ﬁrms in region 0 earn zero proﬁt.
Using this result and by substitution of (45), (46), (62) and (69) into (A8), we
obtain (80).
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